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VESSEL SAFETY PROGRAM

EVEN AFTER SINKING OF SEATTLE-BASED DESTINATION, COAST GUARD SLOW-WALKS TRAINING FOR FISHING BOAT SKIPPERS


By Hal Bernton, Seattle Times Staff Reporter, April 22, 2019

The Coast Guard investigation into the 2017 sinking of the Seattle-based *Destination*, released last month, was the latest in a long succession of Coast Guard inquiries to spotlight serious stability problems that led to commercial fishing boats going down and their crews dying. Earlier findings prompted Congress, in a 2010 overhaul of commercial fishing safety laws, to require operators take a short course that reviews how loading gear, boat modifications and changing weather conditions can affect a vessel's ability to stay afloat. But nine years later, the Coast Guard has yet to come up with regulations to enforce the safety mandate. Even in the aftermath of the *Destination* investigation, which documented the missteps that contributed to the loss of six crew members in the Bering Sea, Coast Guard leaders have yet to say when this training rule might be in place. So the stability courses remain voluntary, often sparsely attended. "It's just exasperating," said Jerry Dzugan, executive director of the AMSEA, which offers a one-day training course. "Some laws just die and go away because no one pays any attention to the fact that regulations were never finalized." The Coast Guard also has failed to sign off on other rules called for in the 2010 legislation, including additional types of training and development of new safety standards for many older fishing vessels. The Coast Guard inaction is part of a slow-walking of safety regulations that has spanned Republican and Democratic presidencies. This has reflected some resistance within the fishing industry to the costs of new rules but also stems from budgetary and staffing strains that have at times made the Coast Guard wary of taking on new watchdog responsibilities. The bureaucratic inertia has deepened during the Trump administration, which has put in place an executive order that calls for two regulations to be removed for every new one that's added and puts caps on how much an agency can spend on enforcing rules. That has complicated the task of finalizing new safety rules even as the Coast Guard's own investigative findings affirm the importance of getting them in place. The three Coast Guard officers who conducted the Marine Board of Investigation into the loss of the *Destination* recommended that federal regulations be updated to require commercial fishing boat operators, as well as owners, show proof of completing a stability course. In a written response included in the final report, assistant commandant Rear Adm. J.P. Nadeau did not commit to a timetable for publishing a new rule. Nadeau later told *The Seattle Times* he does support a training rule but only for operators—not owners. He could not say when a rule might be on the books, noting that the Trump administration's executive order makes that task more difficult. "We still intend to publish regulations. They are taking longer than most of us would like," Nadeau said. During an April 4 congressional hearing, Sen. Maria Cantwell, D-Wash., cited the "heartbreaking sinking" of the *Destination*, and asked Adm. Karl Schultz, the Coast Guard commandant, when the training rule would be put in place. "I would like to get back to you with a firm date. I don't have that here," Schultz responded.

Years of inaction

The 2010 congressional legislation—part of the Coast Guard Reauthorization Act—appeared to set the stage for a major expansion of safety training. Legislation passed in 1988 mandated emergency drill training, and

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LOAD TESTING THE CRANE

All cranes need to be load tested on a regular basis to ensure that they are working properly. How often depends on the certification they will receive and how often they are used, but it should be at least every four years. For vessels, even though load tests are only required every four years for certification it is wise to perform a static load test using a calibrated load cell annually to test the condition of the hydraulic winch and lift cylinders to make sure they are holding and not bleeding off. During this test it is pretty easy to see if the winch brakes are not holding because you will be able to visually see the drum backing off. If it is not the winch then it needs to be determined which boom lift cylinder is responsible and if it is excessive. One way is to do the load test with the knuckle boom all the way out, then after the load test when you have wired down see if the knuckle section will go out. If it does then you know it is the culprit and needs to be repaired. If it doesn't, then it is the main boom lift cylinder that needs to be repaired. Note: When load testing the crane, remember that the crane's capacity is limited to the capacity of the hoist line so if you are in single part you may not be able to load test to its maximum capacity.

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required Coast Guard-certified training for instructors. In the western U.S., two nonprofit groups—the Alaska Marine Safety Education Association and the Seattle-based North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association—developed those initial courses. Their leaders then worked with industry officials to put together a five-day course syllabus covering stability and other topics, such as navigation and avoiding collisions, required by the 2010 act. But no surge of captains attended the new classes since the legislation was never followed up by a Coast Guard-drafted rule. “There are years that we don’t even hold the [stability] course, and normally we get one or two people,” said Karen Conrad, executive director of the North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association. Dzugan said stability courses for the Alaska association average about seven students per class. The 2010 act also charged the Coast Guard with the much more complicated assignment of devising new safety standards for older fishing boats longer than 50 feet. Congress, realizing this would be a big undertaking, gave the Coast Guard seven years. The Coast Guard office in Seattle initially appeared poised to play a big role in that effort. The Coast Guard Sector Puget Sound already had developed safety requirements for a fleet that catches and processes bottom-dwelling fish off Alaska. The Seattle staff offered to develop a broader regional program that would cover some 582 vessels home-ported in Washington and serve as a model for the national effort, according to internal agency documents reviewed by The Seattle Times. But the funding and support didn’t come through. By 2016—with the deadline for publishing the rules just a year away—industry officials were alarmed by the Coast Guard’s lack of progress. They feared a last-minute push could bring poorly crafted regulations that would hamstring their fleets, and congressional representatives from fishing states rallied to their side. “We are ... concerned about the sluggish pace of the design and implementation of the program will place an unnecessary burden on fishermen who may be required to make costly changes to their vessels in less time than the statute intended to provide them,” wrote more than 30 members of Congress, including eight from Washington, in a June 15, 2016, letter to Vice Adm. Fred Midgette, then the Coast Guard’s deputy commandant. The next month, the Coast Guard suspended the rule-making process, and announced it would publish voluntary measures for owners to improve the safety of their boats and for operators to boost training. The Coast Guard later indicated that at some future date it would consider mandatory safety rules.

Would more training have changed Destination’s fate?

The two-year Destination investigation brought new scrutiny to the Coast Guard’s slow-moving safety rule-making process. During August 2017 hearings on the sinking, Conrad and Dzugan each testified about the scant attendance in their classes. Then in March of this year, the Marine Board report concluded that the Destination — even before it left the port of Dutch Harbor, Alaska — had serious stability problems that investigators blamed on decisions by the boat captain and boat owner:

- The Destination carried an estimated 200 crab pots that were heavier than what was recorded in a shipboard document used to guide loading that the owner should have had updated. Stability was further impaired by more than 7,000 pounds of bait that was not supposed to be placed atop the stack of pots.
- With a forecast of difficult weather, Capt. Jeff Hathaway set out from Dutch Harbor with a fatigued crew, who then did not appear to remove a heavy buildup of ice that further eroded stability.
- A hatch improperly left open allowed the rapid flooding that doomed the crew.

Hathaway was a veteran with more than 30 years’ experience harvesting crab off Alaska. He was a respected and able skipper who may have felt no need to take a class on stability. There is no record that he ever enrolled — on a voluntary basis — in the training called for by Congress back in 2010. If Hathaway had taken the course, would he have loaded less onto

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the boat? Would he have pushed boat owner David Wilson to follow through on a recommendation for a new stability test that would have accurately weighed the pots? Or would the class have made no difference in the tragic outcome? Dzugan notes that 98% of fishermen who participated in the Alaska association stability classes said in surveys that the knowledge they gained would change their safety practices. Since Congress passed the 2010 act, more than 100 fishermen have lost their lives at sea due to their boats that sank or capsized, according to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. “Some of those people would not have died, I believe, if that protective training had been required,” Dzugan said.

THE REAL STORY OF HOW THE COAST GUARD RESCUE SWIMMERS PROGRAM WAS RESCUED FROM THE COAST GUARD

By Robert Frump, February 17, 2019

The SS Marine Electric sank 36 years ago this month and one of the leg-ends emerging from the tragedy was that a spontaneous wave of reform swept over the Coast Guard at that time. The legend of reform is true, but the image of a spontaneous movement of reform fluidly seeping through the agency and maritime safety institutions is not. More apt a metaphor? Reformers achieved new standards and programs by drilling through granite and blasting through marble barriers. A case in point was the final release of the Marine Board of Investigation report itself. The final draft—highly critical of the Coast Guard and the American Bureau of Shipping inspection standards—was held up at headquarters for months. Only when Captain Domenic A. Calicchio—with great damage to his career—threatened to release the report to the public did the Commandant release the findings. And then, a major part of the report, removing third party private inspection agencies from the process, was rejected. Still, the report, and a crackdown on very old ships helped usher in a new era of safety and awareness—one that helped prevent major catastrophes at sea for 30 years. The point is only this: reform does not happen easily. And the Coast Guard particularly has a history of resisting it. The helicopter, for example, was assigned a third cousin status for years in favor of sea-plane rescue strategies. And it can be said that in its favor, once the Coast Guard is set on reform, the agency moves with resolve and thoroughness. Such was the case in the formation of the now famous rescue swimmers program of the Coast Guard. The Marine Electric tragedy showed the need for such a service. One Navy rescue swimmer at the site of the sinking was able to help some mariners plunged into the cold water off Virginia, but the Coast Guard rescue helicopter could only lower baskets to men too cold to cling to the devices for rescue. The loss of 31 men—many to hypothermia—was not enough to spur the Coast Guard of itself to seek the reform, even with a friendly Congress willing to fund the service. US Rep. Gerry Studds of Massachusetts held hearings on a bill to form the rescue swimmer program just five months after the disaster and grilled Commandant James S. Gracey about Coast Guard views on the rescue swimmer program. At that time, Admiral Gracey was at best non-committal. Here’s the transcript.

Mr. STUDDS: At our hearing on July 27, we received testimony that the Navy estimates that Coast Guard personnel would be able to participate in the (Navy rescue swimmer) program at a cost of \$1530 per student. Has the Coast Guard made a decision about whether or not to begin participating?

Admiral GRACEY: No, we haven’t. We are looking at it, evaluating it, trying to see what questioning the value would be for us in our rescue work and whether the costs would be justified.

Mr. STUDDS: When this subject came up, it was a surprise to me, frankly, that the Coast Guard did not have trained rescue swimmers.

There are none in the Coast Guard; is that right?

Admiral GRACEY: We have a lot of people who swim very well but we do not have trained rescue swimmers per se.

Mr. STUDDS: I guess I should have known that. What could be a more obvious appropriate skill for an agency whose principal mission is search and rescue in the water?

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SAFETY

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Admiral GRACEY: If I may just briefly tell you a story about a lifeboat station in Lake Michigan when I was District Commander there. They believe in swimming and they were all trained swimmers. One day, they were on a rescue and suddenly discovered they had all gone in the water. There was nobody in the boat. We would like to keep people around the boat and we are not too wild about everybody leaping into the water. So there is a great difficulty in making sure that you would have a trained swimmer on each and every rescue. Obviously, it has got a lot of benefit and I wouldn't refute it. What we are trying to find out is how to make it work and whether it is worth getting into that specific theme or some other.

Mr. STUDDS: If that is the element of thinking, I can see we are not going to get very far in terms of helicopters and aircraft.

Admiral GRACEY: We sure don't want them leaping out of those.

Studds and Congress did a lot more than argue the point. When the Coast Guard leadership continued to drag its feet, Congress forced the issue and required the Coast Guard to create the school. Rescue swimmers now regularly jump out of helicopters of course and have saved thousands of lives. "It's another example of how specific legislation was required to move the ball on Coast Guard safety," said Richard Hiscock, an industry safety advocate who was involved in the legislation requiring the school. "It's also another example of the Coast Guard resisting change—and then once the change was forced upon them, implementing it with great skill and conviction," Hiscock added. The lesson is only this: If you want to drive change within the Coast Guard, you really have to hammer it through. The obvious may present itself—in the form of the need for choppers, rescue swimmers and better safety inspections. Tragedy may drive that message home. (All maritime reforms are written in blood, one historian wrote.) But at the end of the day, only courage and single minded persistence can make the real reform.



INSPECTIONS AND COMPLIANCE DIRECTORATE

Don't get burned! Be ready with a proper Fireman's Outfit.

Washington, DC, March 13, 2019

Deficiencies related to firefighting safety and appliances continue to be the leading cause of detentions in the San Francisco area. Moreover, during the fourth quarter of 2018, there was an increase in deficiencies that related to missing or unserviceable fireman's outfits. A fireman's outfit is essential to adequately protect the crew members from heat, smoke, and steam and allows them to attack the root of the fire effectively. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1 and International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 2 require fireman's outfits to be aboard certain commercial fishing, cargo, passenger, and tank vessels. The minimum number of fireman's outfits required on board can range from two to four sets depending on the tonnage and required equipment may vary depending on service/type of vessel. They should be stowed in widely separate locations. For U.S. flagged vessels, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has established a standard on fireman's outfits. NFPA 1971, Standard on Protective Ensemble for Structural Fire Fighting, provides guidance on minimum requirements for design, manufacturing and certification of protective ensembles, to include coats, trousers, coveralls, helmets, gloves, footwear and interfacing components. For foreign flagged vessels, SOLAS regulations Chapter II Regulation 17 and the International Code for Fire Safety Systems (FSS Code) established standards for fireman's outfits. The U.S. Coast Guard strongly recommends that vessel owners, operators and other responsible parties take the following measures:

- Inspect your fireman's outfits for functionality and fit.

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- Repair or replace equipment when worn or expired.
- Practice donning the fireman's outfit and conduct realistic drills utilizing the required safety equipment to ensure the crew is familiar and ready to use in an emergency.
- Remedy deficiencies in accordance with their SMS before the ship enters port and report any unresolved issues on their advance notice of arrival.

NIOSH

SKIFF SAFETY: SMALL BOAT, BIG RISKS

By Samantha Case, KC Elliott, and Ted Teske

It can happen in an instant. The weather's turned rough and the waves are starting to get large, but there's just a bit more to be done before you can head back for the day. Besides, you're close to shore — what's the worst that could happen? But then there's a large wave, a sudden rock of the boat. When you're in a skiff, swampings and capsizings can happen so fast that you're in the water before you even know what's happened. As we head into summer, we'd like to take a quick moment to look at skiff safety. We often hear about larger vessel disasters, but did you know two-thirds of vessel disaster deaths in Alaska during 2010–2014 were actually victims working in skiffs? In fact, the Alaska salmon set net fleet had the highest number of fatalities (7) of any fleet in the state during that time period. Most of these deaths were due to skiff swampings and capsizings, but some occurred when a crewman fell overboard. During this same time period, five clambers transiting in a skiff perished in a single vessel disaster. This problem isn't unique to Alaska, either. The West Coast tribal salmon set net fleet working on the Columbia River experienced four fatalities during 2010–2014. We want to make sure you're doing everything you can to come home alive and well, so here are a few simple steps you can take to make your time in a skiff safer. The first and most important step is to wear your life jacket, also known as a Personal Floatation Device (PFD), at all times. Since skiff accidents can happen quickly, there's usually no time to put one on after the fact. In 2010, the crew of the *F/V Paul Revere* were checking their nets in Bristol Bay when a large wave capsized their skiff. Thanks to the life vests the crew wore as a standard part of their gear, they were able to survive two hours in cold water as they gripped nets and slowly worked their way back to shore. Contrary to popular belief, it's not hypothermia that usually causes drownings. Instead, it's a condition called swimming failure: the loss of muscle coordination to keep swimming. This can happen long before hypothermia, and it's also why PFDs are so important. PFDs allow you time to float and focus on how to get out of the water. PFDs also give you more time to be rescued — even in cold water. Some fishermen may think PFDs get in the way of working, or that they might get snagged or entangled in gear, but there are PFDs which could work well in skiffs. A NIOSH study found that fishermen who tried out some of the newly-designed PFDs described them as "lightweight," "did not interfere with their work," "did not snag on fishing gear," and "easy to clean and put on." More PFDs are coming on the market with commercial fishermen in mind. The best PFD is the one you'll wear every day. Take the time now to find a PFD that fits you and your gear type before the start of the season.

Here are a few more ways you can prepare your skiff and crew:

Avoid fishing and transiting in heavy weather:

- Listen to weather forecasts and heed all warnings.
 - Stay in if waves are expected to be too large to operate your skiff safely.
 - If bad weather strikes unexpectedly, seek shelter immediately.
- Have a way to call for help:
- Pack your skiff with communication equipment like a waterproof VHF radio.
 - Inspect and maintain your survival gear.
 - Take a marine safety course and refresher every five years.

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NTSB'S ROLE IN MARINE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS

By Capt. James Scheffer, Strategic Advisor, NTSB Office of Marine Safety, May 2, 2019

I'm often asked how the NTSB chooses which marine accidents to investigate, and what role the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) plays in our investigations. I had the same question when I first joined the NTSB's Office of Marine Safety more than 20 years ago. The NTSB has specific authority under the United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations to investigate "major marine casualties." These are accidents involving vessels that result in one or more of the following:

- The loss of six or more lives.
- The loss of a mechanically propelled vessel of 100 or more gross tons.
- Property damage initially estimated as \$500,000 or more.
- Serious threat, as determined by the USCG commandant and concurred with by the NTSB chairman, to life, property, or the environment by hazardous materials.

Our authority to investigate covers major marine accidents on U.S. waters or those involving U.S.-flagged vessels worldwide. We also have the authority to investigate casualties involving public (owned by the U.S.) and nonpublic vessels. In these casualties the threshold is defined by at least one fatality or damages of \$75,000 or greater. Our task in these investigations, whether a major marine casualty or a public and non-public casualty, is to determine the probable cause of the accident and identify safety recommendations that will prevent similar events in the future. We also investigate, independently or with other government agencies, marine accidents in which the United States is a substantially interested state (SIS), according to the International Maritime Organization's "Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents." So, where does the USCG fit in? The USCG conducts preliminary investigations of all marine accidents, then notifies us when an accident qualifies as a major marine casualty. Unlike in other modes of transportation, such as aviation, where the NTSB leads the investigation, the USCG typically takes the lead in marine casualty investigations. Under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the NTSB and USCG, however, the NTSB may become the lead federal agency for the investigation, depending on the circumstances. This may occur when there is a significant marine accident that is a subset of a major marine casualty and is defined in the MOU as the following:

- The loss of three or more lives on a commercial passenger vessel.
- Loss of life or serious injury to 12 or more persons on any commercial vessel.
- The loss of a mechanically propelled commercial vessel of 1,600 or more gross tons.
- Any marine casualty with loss of life involving a highway, bridge, railroad, or other shore side structure.
- Serious threat, as determined by the USCG commandant and concurred with by the NTSB chairman, or their designees, to life, property, or the environment by hazardous materials.
- Significant safety issues, as determined by the commandant and concurred with by the chairman, or their designees, relating to Coast Guard marine safety functions.

If a marine casualty meets any of the above significant marine accident criteria the NTSB may elect to be the lead federal investigative agency. In marine casualties involving a public (federal government) and a non-public vessel, if the vessel is Coast Guard the NTSB must investigate and be the lead federal agency. With casualties involving other public and non-public vessels, in most cases, the NTSB investigates as the lead federal agency. The Office of Marine Safety typically investigates 30 to 40 marine accidents per year meeting the above criteria, and we do so with a staff of only 21 people, including investigators, writers, support staff and supervisors/managers. To get an overview of the Office of Marine Safety's work, take a look at our *Safer Seas Digest*, which can be found on our ntsb.gov website, and summarizes our recent accident investigations and findings.

LIFEJACKETS FOR LOBSTERMEN SEEKS TO CHANGE CULTURE AND SAVE LIVES

By Kiernan Dunlop, March 31, 2019

Life jackets save lives. That's the simple message that Lifejackets for Lobstermen is trying to spread across port cities in Massachusetts and Maine. The message may seem intuitive, but according to statistics from the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, it's not. From 2010-14, lobster fishing deaths ranked the highest in occupational fatalities in East Coast Fisheries and in 80 percent of those deaths, from either falls overboard or vessel disasters, none of the recovered victims was wearing a life jacket. In response to this trend, the Northeast Center for Occupational Health and Safety: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (NEC) used a grant from NIOSH to work with 181 lobstermen in Massachusetts and Maine to find out what they could do to increase life jacket use. They gave the lobstermen one of nine different styles of life jacket at random and asked them to use it for a month and share their input on things like comfort and their ability to work while wearing it. The study and the feedback they received led to their project Lifejackets for Lobstermen. "This is completely driven by the lobstermen we're working with," said Rebecca Weil, a research coordinator for NEC. "This is based upon the feedback that they've given us." The project consists of two vans that will drive around Massachusetts and Maine for eight months starting in April going from port to port letting lobster and fishermen try on 11 different styles of life jackets and purchase one for a 50 percent discount. They are using vans to make it as easy as possible for members of the fishing community to have access to them, because wearing life jackets is not always a priority. "Life jackets are not popular in the fishing community," said Ed Dennehy, director of Safety Training for Fishing Partnerships Support Services, who partnered with NEC on the study and project. "I think we're changing the culture a little bit." Weil said, "Our goal is very simple, to keep people alive and able to do their work."

NTSB – ROUGE WAVE DAMAGES FISHING VESSEL

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued the report of its investigation of the 26 January 2018 marine casualty on the commercial fishing vessel Progress. The vessel was riding out heavy weather in the Bering Sea north of Unimak Island, Alaska, when a large wave struck the wheelhouse. Several windows were damaged by the force of the wave, and seawater ruined navigational and other electrical equipment and knocked out the vessel's electrical power. The five crewmembers reestablished control and Good Samaritan vessels led the Progress back to Dutch Harbor, Alaska. The vessel sustained \$1.3 million in damage. No pollution or injuries were reported. The probable cause of the damage was an encounter with a considerably larger wave than those the vessel had been experiencing while hove to in gale-force conditions.

FISHING BOAT RESCUES FIVE FROM LIFE RAFT SOUTH OF ALEUTIANS

By Associated Press, Feb 15, 2019

ANCHORAGE, Alaska (AP)—Five crew members of a commercial fishing boat were rescued after their vessel sank in Alaska waters. The Coast Guard says the five from the Pacific 1 were picked up from an inflatable life raft about 40 miles southwest of Dutch Harbor by a second commercial fishing boat, the Kona Kai. The Kona Kai transported the five in good condition to Dutch Harbor. After the Pacific 1 reported taking on water and listing heavily, the Kona Kai relayed the distress signal to the Coast Guard and motored to the last known location of the stricken vessel. Coast Guard helicopters searched, spotted the raft and deployed a data marker buoy. An "inflight problem" forced the helicopter to fly back to its base.



COAST GUARD RELEASES FINAL ACTION MEMO FOR F/V DESTINATION

By Maritime Executive, March 3, 2019

The U.S. Coast Guard released the fishing vessel *Destination* Marine Board of Investigation report along with the Final Action Memo, which is the Coast Guard Commandant's response to the report and its safety recommendations. The *Destination* disappeared with all hands on the morning of February 11, 2017, while under way from Dutch Harbor to St. Paul. Her EPIRB activated after 0600 hours and alerted the authorities to her sinking, but no mayday call was received. SAR units located her debris field and a sheen, but no sign of her six crewmembers. Her wreckage was later found just off St. George Island, about 200 nautical miles northwest of Dutch Harbor. The Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation determined that the initiating event occurred when the *Destination* transited past the leeward and sheltered side of St. George Island and altered course to starboard into the hazardous seas off Dainoi Point. Subsequent events include the vessel's abrupt loss of speed, maneuverability and heading shift, which allowed boarding seas to flood, capsize and sink the vessel. The primary causal factors that directly contributed to the casualty include:

- The vessel's unsafe stability conditions due to the carriage of heavier crab pots that exceeded the weight used in the stability instructions,
- Additional weight and stability stress from bait loaded high on the vessel,
- Excessive ice accumulations from freezing spray,
- Downflooding from the open number 3 hold access hatch.

Other causal factors include the captain's failure to:

- Load in accordance with the vessel's stability information book,
- Prevent excessive icing accumulations from the prevailing freezing spray conditions,
- Secure the number 3 hold access hatch while transiting.

Also contributing to the casualty was the owner's failure to select a qualified individual to perform tests or calculations necessary to evaluate the vessel's stability and update the stability instructions to reflect heavier crab pots and other alterations to the vessel. Accordingly, the owner failed to provide the captain with accurate information to maintain the vessel in a satisfactory stability condition. The report recommended that the Commandant conduct a targeted oversight audit on all commercial fishing vessels subject to the relevant stability requirements. However, the Commandant, Rear Admiral John P. Nadeau disagrees. "There is not sufficient evidence in this report to conclude additional oversight is needed across the entire fleet of commercial fishing vessels." The report also recommended changes to icing regulations to specifically require owners to ensure the qualified individual includes within the stability instructions the weight and thickness of assumed ice used within the stability calculations. Also, when vessels operate under freezing spray forecasts that the stability instructions should indicate the vessel may experience icing conditions that exceed the vessel's stability and that captains shall consider delaying departure from port or seek protected waters. The Commandant disagreed with this recommendation indicating that the relevant requirements should be general in nature focusing on the overall ease of understanding and use of the instructions rather than prescribing detailed requirements for their specific content. "This is to provide maximum flexibility for owners and qualified individuals to determine how the instructions are conveyed taking into account the unique issues that apply to an individual vessel, the personnel who will be using the instructions and its anticipated operating conditions. The stability instructions should include conditions of icing where it is reasonable that it will be encountered."

COAST GUARD TO HOLD PUBLIC HEARING FOR MARY B II INVESTIGATION

SEATTLE—The Coast Guard is conducting a formal public hearing beginning May 13, 2019 at the Newport, Oregon City Hall to consider evidence related to the Mary B II marine casualty investigation, and media and the public are invited to attend. The hearing will focus on the capsizing of the commercial fishing vessel Mary B II, which led to the deaths of three fishermen at the entrance of Yaquina Bay, Oregon, January 8, 2019.

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The three fishermen were inbound the Yaquina Bay Bar aboard the 42-foot vessel Mary B II when it capsized into the stormy Pacific Ocean with reported waves of 14 to 16 feet with occasional waves of 20 feet. The hearing is scheduled to convene at the Newport City Hall at 8:00 a.m. May 13 and will continue to May 17, 2019. The address is 169 SW Coast Highway, Newport, OR 97365. A Coast Guard spokesperson will be available to meet with interested media at 7:00 a.m. Monday before the hearing begins. The hearing will also be streamed live each day at: <https://livestream.com/accounts/17374493/events/8625145>. The Coast Guard has established an e-mail address for the public and interested parties to provide information, ask questions and make comments related to the ongoing investigation and scheduled hearing. This e-mail will be checked regularly and all correspondence will be acknowledged. The e-mail is MaryBII.uscg@gmail.com. Throughout the investigation the Coast Guard will also continue to monitor any email that is sent to accidentinfo@uscg.mil and all information sent to that address will be reviewed and responded to.

12 COAST GUARD MEMBERS FACE CHARGES IN ALASKA DRUG PROBE

By Associated Press, February 27, 2019

KODIAK, Alaska — The U.S. Coast Guard has initiated criminal proceedings against 12 service members following an investigation into possible drug activity on Alaska's Kodiak Island. The agency removed several members in Kodiak from duty last fall as investigators examined allegations of members using illegal drugs, the Kodiak Daily Mirror reported Tuesday. Six more members were disciplined in nonjudicial punishment proceedings, and they are "being processed for separation," the agency said in a statement. The nonjudicial process does not result in criminal convictions, but could lead to punishments ranging from loss of pay to suspension, said Lt. Cmdr. Raymond Reichl, external affairs officer for the 17th Coast Guard District. The investigation has not ended yet, so additional members could be charged or considered for nonjudicial punishment, the agency said. The criminal proceedings will occur under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The Coast Guard has not released the names of the service members facing criminal charges. "The Coast Guard treats all allegations of illicit drug activity seriously," said Capt. Melissa Rivera, chief of staff for the Coast Guard district. "Drug use is prohibited, is a violation of both Coast Guard policy and federal law, and is in direct contradiction of our core values of Honor, Respect, and Devotion to Duty." The agency did not disclose what prompted the investigation. Reichl said in October that investigators received an "indicator," and the scope of the probe was expanded after "more and more details unraveled." The probe involved members from a variety of units, Reichl previously said. The members targeted by the investigation were removed from duty status, meaning they were not allowed to participate in security watches, aircraft or boat duties, and other routine activities.

COAST GUARD GIVES SAFETY TRAINING AT FISHERMEN'S FORUM

March 4, 2019

Rockport — At the Maine Fishermen's Forum, which took place at the Samoset Resort in Rockport, from Feb. 28 through March 2, the Coast Guard's Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Program provided water safety training in the resort's pool for adults and kids. The training included life raft and immersion suit training as well as instruction on water survival techniques and free inspections of immersion suits. Attendees were allowed to either bring their own suit or try one of the Coast Guard's in the heated pool. The annual Maine Fishermen's Forum hosts fishermen, gear suppliers, scientists, government and other stakeholders to collaborate on all things fishing: markets, resource status, regulations, the latest in technology, and the environment.

JUNE – DECEMBER 2019 CLASS SCHEDULE

STCW 5-DAY BASIC TRAINING (BT)

\$1,100 MEMBERS / \$1,175 NON-MEMBERS

Jun. 3-7, Jul. 8-12, Aug. 12-16, Sept. 9-13, Oct. 7-11, Nov. 11-15, Dec. 9-13

STCW BASIC TRAINING REFRESHER

\$900 MEMBERS / \$925 NON-MEMBERS

Jun. 4/6/7, Jul. 8/10/11, Aug. 12/14/15, Sept. 10/12/13, Oct. 7/9/10, Nov. 11/13/14, Dec. 9/11/12

STCW BASIC TRAINING REVALIDATION

\$765 MEMBERS / \$795 NON-MEMBERS

Jun. 4&6, Jul. 10&11, Aug. 14&15, Sept. 10&12, Oct. 9&10, Nov. 13&14, Dec. 11&12

MEDICAL EMERGENCIES AT SEA

\$125 MEMBERS / \$135 NON-MEMBERS

Jun. 7, Jul. 8, Aug. 12, Sept. 13, Oct. 7, Nov. 11, Dec. 9

2-DAY BASIC FIRE FIGHTING

\$645 MEMBERS / \$665 NON-MEMBERS

Jun. 5-6, Jul. 9-10, Aug. 13-14, Sept. 11-12, Oct. 8-9, Nov. 12-13, Dec. 10-11

DRILL INSTRUCTOR WORKSHOP

\$175 MEMBERS / \$200 NON-MEMBERS

Jun. 5, Jul. 18, Aug. 8, Sept. 5, Oct. 21, Nov. 6, Dec. 4

SHIPYARD COMPETENT PERSON

\$575 MEMBERS / \$595 NON-MEMBERS

Jun. 12-14, Sept. 11-13, Oct. 16-18, Nov. 13-15, Dec. 11-13

SHIPYARD COMPETENT PERSON REFRESHER

\$200 MEMBERS / \$225 NON-MEMBERS

Jun. 14, Sept. 13, Oct. 18, Nov. 15, Dec. 13

24-HOUR HAZWOPER TECHNICIAN

\$425 MEMBERS / \$450 NON-MEMBERS

Jun. 24-26, Jul. 29-31, Aug. 26-28, Sept. 23-25, Oct. 28-30, Nov. 25-27, Dec. 16-18

8-HOUR HAZWOPER REFRESHER

\$200 MEMBERS / \$225 NON-MEMBERS

ON FIRST OR LAST DAY OF 24-HOUR CLASS

SPECIMEN COLLECTION CERTIFICATION

\$150 MEMBERS / \$175 NON-MEMBERS

Jun. 18, Jul. 16, Aug. 20, Sept. 19, Oct. 15, Nov. 19, Dec. 19

STCW MEDICAL CARE PROVIDER

\$1,300 MEMBERS / \$1,400 NON-MEMBERS

Dec. 3-6

PLEASE CALL US TO SCHEDULE THE FOLLOWING CLASSES:

SAFETY EQUIPMENT & SURVIVAL PROCEDURES

\$280 MEMBERS / \$300 NON-MEMBERS

8-HOUR SHIPBOARD DAMAGE CONTROL

\$300 MEMBERS / \$315 NON-MEMBERS

STABILITY

\$150 MEMBERS/\$175 NON-MEMBERS

SAFETY BITES & MEMBER NEWS

NPFVOA Welcomes New Individual Member Patrick Gudmundson!

WHAT'S NEW?

NPFVOA understands how difficult it can be to have your crews take the training they need to keep certifications current. We are pleased to announce that we have an instructor who can either ride northbound or southbound on your vessel and hold First Aid/CPR, HAZWOPER Refresher, and Drill Instructor courses. They can also run drills with your crews or work with your fire teams. The potential training is endless! Call Rebecca to schedule.

A SPECIAL THANKS TO:


American Seafoods and Marine Safety Services for the generous donation of Immersion Suits!

NPFVOA'S FALL GOLF TOURNAMENT FUNDRAISER

Tuesday, September 17, 2019

Redmond Ridge Golf Club

1pm Start Time



Day of fun with dinner to follow!
If you haven't attended our tournaments in the past and would like to this year, please email info@npfvoa.org to be added to our mailing list.

NPFVOA VESSEL SAFETY PROGRAM STAFF

KAREN CONRAD—EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

REBECCA HANRATTY—PROGRAM COORDINATOR

KRYSTLE REITER—PROGRAM ASSISTANT

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For your convenience, current and past issues of our newsletter are available online at npfvoa.org.

This newsletter is published quarterly by the North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners' Association (NPFVOA) Vessel Safety Program and is free to members.

To receive a subscription, please consider joining NPFVOA by completing the membership form on the back page and mailing it to NPFVOA with the appropriate fee.

Memberships are annual, and all contributions are tax deductible.

NPFVOA is a 501(c)(3) non-profit association.

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NPFVOA VESSEL SAFETY PROGRAM

COURSES INCLUDE:

- STCW BASIC TRAINING
- STCW BASIC TRAINING REFRESHER
- STCW 2-DAY BASIC FIREFIGHTING
- STCW MEDICAL EMERGENCIES AT SEA
- STCW PERSONAL SURVIVAL TECHNIQUES
- STCW PERSONAL SAFETY & SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
- STCW MEDICAL CARE PROVIDER
- STCW BASIC TRAINING REVALIDATION
- DRILL INSTRUCTOR WORKSHOP
- 24-HOUR HAZWOPER TECHNICIAN
- 8-HOUR HAZWOPER REFRESHER
- SPECIMEN COLLECTION CERTIFICATION
- SHIPYARD COMPETENT PERSON
- SHIPYARD COMPETENT PERSON REFRESHER
- 8-HOUR SHIPBOARD DAMAGE CONTROL
- OSHA MARINE 10-HOUR
- OSHA COMPLIANCE AT THE DOCK OR SHIPYARD
- ONBOARD DRILL INSTRUCTOR WORKSHOP
- IN-THE-WATER SURVIVAL TRAINING
- PEDESTAL CRANE OPERATOR SAFETY TRAINING
- NAVIGATION: COLLISION AVOIDANCE
- STABILITY
- O/B FIRE TEAM TRAINING

ADDITIONAL CUSTOM COURSES TO FIT ALL YOUR SAFETY TRAINING NEEDS!



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NPFVOA VESSEL SAFETY PROGRAM MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION

The **NPFVOA Vessel Safety Program** is a non-profit association dedicated to education and training in marine safety. Because safety is a concern for everyone in our industry, NPFVOA seeks membership from an expanded industry sector—commercial fishing, workboats, passenger and recreational vessels, and the businesses that support them.

Company Name: _____
Vessel Name: _____
Primary Contact Name & Title: _____
Address: _____
City, State, Zip: _____
Phone: _____
Fax: _____
Email: _____
Web Site: _____

Would you like to receive information & updates via email? Yes No
Would you like us to link to you from our web site? Yes No

Please describe the services your company provides: _____

Vessel Information

Length (feet): _____
Tonnage (GRT): _____
Crew Size: _____

Vessel/Gear Type(s)	Target Fisheries

- | | | |
|--|-------|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Vessel (over 79 ft.) | \$600 | Benefits apply to all current crew members and management company. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Vessel (60-79 ft.) | \$300 | Benefits apply to all current crew members and management company. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Vessel (under 60 ft.) | \$125 | Benefits apply to all current crew members and management company. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Associate | \$400 | Benefits apply to business personnel only; vessel crew ineligible at this level.
(Appropriate for marine support industry, e.g., law firms, ship yards, fuel suppliers, etc.) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Individual | \$75 | Benefits are limited to named individual and are non-transferable
(Appropriate for crewmen and single-person business entities.) |