The Coast Guard investigation into the 2017 sinking of the Seattle-based Destination, released last month, was the latest in a long succession of Coast Guard inquiries to spotlight serious stability problems that led to commercial fishing boats going down and their crews dying. Earlier findings prompted Congress, in a 2010 overhaul of commercial fishing safety laws, to require operators to take a short course that reviews how loading gear, boat modifications and changing weather conditions can affect a vessel’s ability to stay afloat. But nine years later, the Coast Guard has yet to come up with regulations to enforce the safety mandate. Even in the aftermath of the Destination investigation, which documented the missteps that contributed to the loss of six crew members in the Bering Sea, Coast Guard leaders have yet to say when this training rule might be in place. So the stability courses remain voluntary, often sparsely attended. “It’s just exasperating,” said Jerry Dzugan, executive director of the AMSEA, which offers a one-day training course. “Some laws just die and go away because no one pays any attention to the fact that regulations were never finalized.” The Coast Guard also has failed to sign off on other rules called for in the 2010 legislation, including additional types of training and development of new safety standards for many older fishing vessels. The Coast Guard inaction is part of a slow-walking of safety regulations that has spanned Republican and Democratic presidencies. This has reflected some resistance within the fishing industry to the costs of new rules but also stems from budgetary and staffing strains that have at times made the Coast Guard wary of taking on new watchdog responsibilities. The bureaucratic inertia has deepened during the Trump administration, which has put in place an executive order that calls for two regulations to be removed for every new one that’s added and puts caps on how much an agency can spend on enforcing rules. That has complicated the task of finalizing new safety rules even as the Coast Guard’s own investigative findings affirm the importance of getting them in place. The three Coast Guard officers who conducted the Marine Board of Investigation into the loss of the Destination recommended that federal regulations be updated to require commercial fishing boat operators, as well as owners, show proof of completing a stability course. In a written response included in the final report, assistant commandant Rear Adm. J.P. Nadeau did not commit to a timetable for publishing a new rule. Nadeau later told The Seattle Times he does support a training rule but only for operators—not owners. He could not say when a rule might be on the books, noting that the Trump administration’s executive order makes that task more difficult. “We still intend to publish regulations. They are taking longer than most of us would like,” Nadeau said. During an April 4 congressional hearing, Sen. Maria Cantwell, D-Wash., cited the “heartbreaking sinking” of the Destination, and asked Adm. Karl Schultz, the Coast Guard commandant, when the training rule would be put in place. “I would like to get back to you with a firm date. I don’t have that here,” Schultz responded.

**Years of inaction**

The 2010 congressional legislation—part of the Coast Guard Reauthorization Act—appeared to set the stage for a major expansion of safety training. Legislation passed in 1988 mandated emergency drill training, and...
continued from previous page

required Coast Guard-certified training for instructors. In the western U.S., two nonprofit groups—the Alaska Marine Safety Education Association and the Seattle-based North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association—developed those initial courses. Their leaders then worked with industry officials to put together a five-day course syllabus covering stability and other topics, such as navigation and avoiding collisions, required by the 2010 act. But no surge of captains attended the new classes since the legislation was never followed up by a Coast Guard-drafted rule. “There are years that we don’t even hold the [stability] course, and normally we get one or two people,” said Karen Conrad, executive director of the North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association. Dzugan said stability courses for the Alaska association average about seven students per class. The 2010 act also charged the Coast Guard with the much more complicated assignment of devising new safety standards for older fishing boats longer than 50 feet. Congress, realizing this would be a big undertaking, gave the Coast Guard seven years. The Coast Guard office in Seattle initially appeared poised to play a big role in that effort. The Coast Guard Sector Puget Sound staff already had developed safety requirements for a fleet that catches and processes bottom-dwelling fish off Alaska. The Seattle staff offered to develop a broader regional program that would cover some 582 vessels home-ported in Washington and serve as a model for the national effort, according to internal agency documents reviewed by The Seattle Times. But the funding and support didn’t come through. By 2016—with the deadline for publishing the rules just a year away—industry officials were alarmed by the Coast Guard’s lack of progress. They feared a last-minute push could bring poorly crafted regulations that would hamstring their fleets, and congressional representatives from fishing states rallied to their side. “We are … concerned about the sluggish pace of the design and implementation of the program will place an unnecessary burden on fishermen who may be required to make costly changes to their vessels in less time than the statute intended to provide them,” wrote more than 30 members of Congress, including eight from Washington, in a June 15, 2016, letter to Vice Adm. Fred Midgette, then the Coast Guard’s deputy commandant. The next month, the Coast Guard suspended the rule-making process, and announced it would publish voluntary measures for owners to improve the safety of their boats and for operators to boost training. The Coast Guard later indicated that at some future date it would consider mandatory safety rules.

**Would more training have changed Destination’s fate?**

The two-year Destination investigation brought new scrutiny to the Coast Guard’s slow-moving safety rule-making process. During August 2017 hearings on the sinking, Conrad and Dzugan each testified about the scant attendance in their classes. Then in March of this year, the Marine Board report concluded that the Destination— even before it left the port of Dutch Harbor, Alaska— had serious stability problems that investigators blamed on decisions by the boat captain and boat owner:

- The Destination carried an estimated 200 crab pots that were heavier than what was recorded in a shipboard document used to guide loading that the owner should have had updated. Stability was further impaired by more than 7,000 pounds of bait that was not supposed to be placed atop the stack of pots.
- With a forecast of difficult weather, Capt. Jeff Hathaway set out from Dutch Harbor with a fatigued crew, who then did not appear to remove a heavy buildup of ice that further eroded stability.
- A hatch improperly left open allowed the rapid flooding that doomed the crew.

Hathaway was a veteran with more than 30 years’ experience harvesting crab off Alaska. He was a respected and able skipper who may have felt no need to take a class on stability. There is no record that he ever enrolled — on a voluntary basis — in the training called for by Congress back in 2010. If Hathaway had taken the course, would he have loaded less onto the boat? Would he have pushed boat owner David Wilson to follow through on a recommendation for a new stability test that would have accurately weighed the pots? Or would the class have made no difference in the tragic outcome? Dzugan notes that 98% of fishermen who participated in the Alaska association stability classes said in surveys that the knowledge they gained would change their safety practices. Since Congress passed the 2010 act, more than 100 fishermen have lost their lives at sea due to their boats that sank or capsized, according to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. “Some of those people would not have died, I believe, if that protective training had been required,” Dzugan said.

**THE REAL STORY OF HOW THE COAST GUARD RESCUE SWIMMERS PROGRAM WAS RESCUED FROM THE COAST GUARD**

*By Robert Frump, February 17, 2019*

The SS Marine Electric sank 36 years ago this month and one of the legends emerging from the tragedy was that a spontaneous wave of reform swept over the Coast Guard at that time. The legend of reform is true, but the image of a spontaneous movement of reform fluidly seeping through the agency and maritime safety institutions is not. More apt a metaphor? Reformers achieved new standards and programs by drilling through granite and blasting through marble barriers. A case in point was the final release of the Marine Board of Investigation report itself. The final draft—highly critical of the Coast Guard and the American Bureau of Shipping inspection standards—was held up at headquarters for months. Only when Captain Domenic A. Calicchio—with great damage to his career—threatened to release the report to the public did the Commandant release the findings. And then, a major part of the report, removing third party private inspection agencies from the process, was rejected. Still, the report, and a crackdown on very old ships helped usher in a new era of safety and awareness—one that helped prevent major catastrophes at sea for 30 years. The point is only this: reform does not happen easily. And the Coast Guard particularly has a history of resisting it. The helicopter, for example, was assigned a third cousin status for years in favor of sea-plane rescue strategies. And it can be said that in its favor, once the Coast Guard is set on reform, the agency moves with resolve and thoroughness. Such was the case in the formation of the now famous rescue swimmers program of the Coast Guard. The Marine Electric tragedy showed the need for such a service. One Navy rescue swimmer at the site of the sinking was able to help some mariners plunged into the cold water off Virginia, but the Coast Guard rescue helicopter could only lower baskets to men too cold to cling to the devices for rescue. The loss of 31 men—many to hypothermia—was not enough to spur the Coast Guard of itself to seek the reform, even with a friendly Congress willing to fund the service. US Rep. Gerry Studds of Massachusetts held hearings on a bill to form the rescue swimmer program just five months after the disaster and grilled Commandant James S. Gracey about Coast Guard views on the rescue swimmer program. At that time, Admiral Gracey was at best non-committal. Here’s the transcript.

Mr. STUDDS: At our hearing on July 27, we received testimony that the Navy estimates that Coast Guard personnel would be able to participate in the (Navy rescue swimmer) program at a cost of $1530 per student. Has the Coast Guard made a decision about whether or not to begin participating?

Admiral GRACEY: No, we haven’t. We are looking at it, evaluating it, trying to see what questioning the value would be for us in our rescue work and whether the costs would be justified.

Mr. STUDDS: When this subject came up, it was a surprise to me, frankly, that the Coast Guard did not have trained rescue swimmers. There are none in the Coast Guard, is that right?

Admiral GRACEY: We have a lot of people who swim very well but we do not have trained rescue swimmers per se.

Mr. STUDDS: I guess I should have known that. What could be more obvious appropriate skill for an agency who principal mission is search and rescue in the water?
Inspect your fireman’s outfits for functionality and fit. Regulations Chapter II Regulation 17 and the International Code for Fire Protective ensembles, to include coats, trousers, coveralls, helmets, gloves, minimum requirements for design, manufacturing and certification of protective ensembles, to include coats, trousers, coveralls, helmets, gloves, footgear, and interfacing components. For foreign flagged vessels, SOLAS has established a standard on fireman’s outfits. NFPA 1971, Standard on Protective Ensemble for Structural Fire Fighting, provides guidance on protective ensemble design and certification of protective ensembles, to include coats, trousers, coveralls, helmets, gloves, footgear, and interfacing components. For foreign flagged vessels, SOLAS regulations Chapter II Regulation 17 and the International Code for Fire Safety Systems (FSS Code) established standards for fireman’s outfits. The U.S. Coast Guard strongly recommends that vessel owners, operators and other responsible parties take the following measures:

• Inspect your fireman’s outfits for functionality and fit.

Regulations Chapter II Regulation 17 and the International Code for Fire Protective ensembles, to include coats, trousers, coveralls, helmets, gloves, minimum requirements for design, manufacturing and certification of protective ensembles, to include coats, trousers, coveralls, helmets, gloves, footgear, and interfacing components. For foreign flagged vessels, SOLAS has established a standard on fireman’s outfits. NFPA 1971, Standard on Protective Ensemble for Structural Fire Fighting, provides guidance on protective ensemble design and certification of protective ensembles, to include coats, trousers, coveralls, helmets, gloves, footgear, and interfacing components. For foreign flagged vessels, SOLAS regulations Chapter II Regulation 17 and the International Code for Fire Safety Systems (FSS Code) established standards for fireman’s outfits. The U.S. Coast Guard strongly recommends that vessel owners, operators and other responsible parties take the following measures:

• Inspect your fireman’s outfits for functionality and fit.
NTSB’S ROLE IN MARINE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
By Capt. James Scheffer, Strategic Advisor, NTSB Office of Marine Safety, May 2, 2019

I’m often asked how the NTSB chooses which marine accidents to investigate, and what role the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) plays in our investigations. I had the same question when I first joined the NTSB’s Office of Marine Safety more than 20 years ago. The NTSB has specific authority under the United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations to investigate “major marine casualties.” These are accidents involving vessels that result in one or more of the following:

- The loss of six or more lives.
- The loss of a mechanically propelled vessel of 100 or more gross tons.
- Property damage initially estimated as $500,000 or more.
- Serious threat, as determined by the USCG commandant and concurred with by the NTSB chairman, to life, property, or the environment by hazardous materials.

Our authority to investigate covers major marine accidents on U.S. waters or those involving U.S.-flagged vessels worldwide. We also have the authority to investigate casualties involving public (owned by the U.S.) and nonpublic vessels. In these casualties the threshold is defined by at least one fatality or damages of $75,000 or greater. Our task in these investigations, whether a major marine casualty or a public and non-public casualty, is to determine the probable cause of the accident and identify safety recommendations that will prevent similar events in the future. We also investigate, independently or with other government agencies, marine accidents in which the United States is a substantially interested state (SIS), according to the International Maritime Organization’s “Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents.” So, where does the USCG fit in? The USCG conducts preliminary investigations of all marine accidents, then notifies us when an accident qualifies as a major marine casualty. Unlike in other modes of transportation, such as aviation, where the NTSB leads the investigation, the USCG typically takes the lead in marine casualty investigations. Under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the NTSB and USCG, however, the NTSB may become the lead federal agency for the investigation, depending on the circumstances. This may occur when there is a significant marine accident that is a subset of a major marine casualty and is defined in the MOU as the following:

- The loss of three or more lives on a commercial passenger vessel.
- Loss of life or serious injury to 12 or more persons on any commercial vessel.
- The loss of a mechanically propelled commercial vessel of 1,600 or more gross tons.
- Any marine casualty with loss of life involving a highway, bridge, railroad, or other shore side structure.
- Serious threat, as determined by the USCG commandant and concurred with by the NTSB chairman, or their designees, to life, property, or the environment by hazardous materials.
- Significant safety issues, as determined by the commandant and concurred with by the chairman, or their designees, relating to Coast Guard marine safety functions.

If a marine casualty meets any of the above significant marine accident criteria the NTSB may elect to be the lead federal investigative agency. In marine casualties involving a public (federal government) and a non-public vessel, if the vessel is Coast Guard the NTSB must investigate and be the lead federal agency. With casualties involving other public and non-public vessels, in most cases, the NTSB investigates as the lead federal agency. The Office of Marine Safety typically investigates 30 to 40 marine accidents per year meeting the above criteria, and we do so with a staff of only 21 people, including investigators, writers, support staff and supervisors/managers. To get an overview of the Office of Marine Safety’s work, take a look at our Safer Seas Digest, which can be found on our ntsb.gov website, and summarizes our recent accident investigations and findings.

LIFEJACKETS FOR LOBSTERMEN SEEKS TO CHANGE CULTURE AND SAVE LIVES
By Kiernan Dunlop, March 31, 2019

Life jackets save lives. That’s the simple message that Lifejackets for Lobstermen is trying to spread across port cities in Massachusetts and Maine. The message may seem intuitive, but according to statistics from the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, it’s not. From 2010-14, lobster fishing deaths ranked the highest in occupational fatalities in East Coast Fisheries and in 80 percent of those deaths, from either falls overboard or vessel disasters, none of the recovered victims was wearing a life jacket. In response to this trend, the Northeast Center for Occupational Health and Safety: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (NEC) used a grant from NIOSH to work with 181 lobstermen in Massachusetts and Maine to find out what they could do to increase life jacket use. They gave the lobstermen one of nine different styles of life jacket at random and asked them to use it for a month and share their input on things like comfort and their ability to work while wearing it. The study and the feedback they received led to their project Lifejackets for Lobstermen. “This is completely driven by the lobstermen we’re working with,” said Rebecca Weil, a research coordinator for NEC. “This is based upon the feedback that they’ve given us.” The project consists of two vans that will drive around Massachusetts and Maine for eight months starting in April going from port to port letting lobster and fishermen try on 11 different styles of life jackets and purchase one for a 50 percent discount. They are using vans to make it as easy as possible for members of the fishing community to have access to them, because wearing life jackets is not always a priority. “Life jackets are not popular in the fishing community,” said Ed Dennenby, director of Safety Training for Fishing Partnerships Support Services, who partnered with NEC on the study and project. “I think we’re changing the culture a little bit.” Weil said, “Our goal is very simple, to keep people alive and able to do their work.”

NTSB – ROUGE WAVE DAMAGES FISHING VESSEL

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued the report of its investigation of the 26 January 2018 marine casualty on the commercial fishing vessel Progress. The vessel was riding out heavy weather in the Bering Sea north of Unimak Island, Alaska, when a large wave struck the wheelhouse. Several windows were damaged by the force of the wave, and seawater ruined navigational and other electrical equipment and knocked out the vessel’s electrical power. The five crewmembers reestablished control and Good Samaritan vessels led the Progress back to Dutch Harbor, Alaska. The vessel sustained $1.3 million in damage. No pollution or injuries were reported. The probable cause of the damage was an encounter with a considerably larger wave than those the vessel had been experiencing while hove to in gale-force conditions.

FISHING BOAT RESCUES FIVE FROM LIFE RAFT SOUTH OF ALEUTIANS

By Associated Press, Feb 15, 2019

ANCHORAGE, Alaska (AP)—Five crew members of a commercial fishing boat were rescued after their vessel sank in Alaska waters. The Coast Guard says the five from the Pacific 1 were picked up from an inflatable life raft about 40 miles southwest of Dutch Harbor by a second commercial fishing boat, the Kona Kai. The Kona Kai transported the five in good condition to Dutch Harbor. After the Pacific 1 reported taking on water and listing heavily, the Kona Kai relayed the distress signal to the Coast Guard and motored to the last known location of the stricken vessel. Coast Guard helicopters searched, spotted the raft and deployed a data marker buoy. An “inflight problem” forced the helicopter to fly back to its base.
The U.S. Coast Guard released the fishing vessel Destination Marine Board of Investigation report along with the Final Action Memo, which is the Coast Guard Commandant’s response to the report and its safety recommendations. The Destination disappeared without trace on February 11, 2017, while under way from Dutch Harbor to St. Paul, Alaska. The EPIRB activated after 0600 hours and alerted the authorities to her sinking. SAR units located her debris field and a sheen, but no sign of her six crewmembers. Her wreckage was later found just off St. George Island, about 200 nautical miles northwest of Dutch Harbor. The Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation determined that the initiating event occurred when the Destination transited past the leeward and sheltered side of St. George Island and altered course to starboard into the hazardous seas off Dainoi Point. Subsequent events include the vessel’s abrupt loss of speed, maneuverability and heading shift, which allowed boarding seas to flood, capsize and sink the vessel. The primary causal factors that directly contributed to the casualty include:

- The vessel’s unsafe stability conditions due to the carriage of heavier crab pots that exceeded the weight used in the stability instructions,
- Additional weight and stability stress from bale load high on the vessel,
- Excessive ice accumulations from freezing spray,
- Downflooding from the open number 3 hold access hatch.

Other causal factors include the captain’s failure to:

- Load in accordance with the vessel’s stability information book,
- Prevent excessive icing accumulations from the prevailing freezing spray conditions,
- Secure the number 3 hold access hatch while transiting.

Also contributing to the casualty was the owner’s failure to select a qualified individual to perform tests or calculations necessary to evaluate the vessel’s stability and update the stability instructions to reflect heavier crab pots and other alterations to the vessel. Accordingly, the owner failed to provide the captain with accurate information to maintain the vessel in a satisfactory stability condition. The report recommended that the Commandant conduct a targeted oversight audit on all commercial fishing vessels subject to the relevant stability requirements. However, the Commandant, Rear Admiral John P. Nadeau disagrees. “There is not sufficient evidence in this report to conclude additional oversight is needed across the entire fleet of commercial fishing vessels.” The report also recommended changes to icing regulations to specifically require owners to ensure the qualified individual includes within the stability instructions the weight and thickness of assumed ice used within the stability calculations. Also, when vessels operate under freezing spray forecasts that the stability instructions should indicate the vessel may experience icing conditions that exceed the vessel’s stability and that captains shall consider delaying departure from port or seek protected waters. The Commandant disagreed with this recommendation indicating that the relevant requirements should be general in nature focusing on the overall ease of understanding and use of the instructions rather than prescribing detailed requirements for their specific content. “This is to provide maximum flexibility for owners and qualified individuals to determine how the instructions are conveyed taking into account the unique issues that apply to an individual vessel, the personnel who will be using the instructions and its anticipated operating conditions. The stability instructions should include conditions of icing where it is reasonable that it will be encountered.”

---

COAST GUARD TO HOLD PUBLIC HEARING FOR MARY B II INVESTIGATION

SEATTLE — The Coast Guard is conducting a formal public hearing beginning May 13, 2019 at the Newport, Oregon City Hall to consider evidence related to the Mary B II marine casualty investigation, and media and the public are invited to attend. The hearing will focus on the capsizing of the commercial fishing vessel Mary B II, which led to the deaths of three fishermen at the entrance of Yaquina Bay, Oregon, January 8, 2019.

---

OTHER NEWS

12 COAST GUARD MEMBERS FACE CHARGES IN ALASKA DRUG PROBE

By Associated Press, February 27, 2019

KODIAK, Alaska — The U.S. Coast Guard has initiated criminal proceedings against 12 service members following an investigation into possible drug activity on Alaska’s Kodiak Island. The agency removed several members in Kodiak from duty last fall as investigators examined allegations of members using illegal drugs, the Kodiak Daily Mirror reported Tuesday. Six more members were disciplined in nonjudicial punishment proceedings, and they are “being processed for separation,” the agency said in a statement. The nonjudicial process does not result in criminal convictions, but could lead to punishments ranging from loss of pay to suspension, said Lt. Cmdr. Raymond Reichl, external affairs officer for the 17th Coast Guard District. The investigation has not ended yet, so additional members could be charged or considered for nonjudicial punishment, the agency said. The criminal proceedings will occur under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The Coast Guard has not released the names of the service members facing criminal charges. “The Coast Guard treats all allegations of illicit drug activity seriously,” said Capt. Melissa Rivera, chief of staff for the Coast Guard district. “Drug use is prohibited, is a violation of both Coast Guard policy and federal law, and is in direct contradiction of our core values of Honor, Respect, and Devotion to Duty.” The agency did not disclose what prompted the investigation. Reichl said in October that investigators received an “indicator,” and the scope of the probe was expanded after “more and more details unraveled.” The probe involved members from a variety of units, Reichl previously said. The members targeted by the investigation were removed from duty status, meaning they were not allowed to participate in security watches, aircraft or boat duties, and other routine activities.

COAST GUARD GIVES SAFETY TRAINING AT FISHERMEN’S FORUM

March 4, 2019

Rockport — At the Maine Fishermen’s Forum, which took place at the Samoset Resort in Rockport, from Feb. 28 through March 2, the Coast Guard’s Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Program provided water safety training in the resort’s pool for adults and kids. The training included life raft and immersion suit training as well as instruction on water survival techniques and free inspections of immersion suits. Attendees were allowed to either bring their own suit or try one of the Coast Guard’s in the heated pool. The annual Maine Fishermen’s Forum hosts fishermen, gear suppliers, scientists, government and other stakeholders to collaborate on all things fishing: markets, resource status, regulations, the latest in technology, and the environment.

---

continued from previous column

The three fishermen were inbound the Yaquina Bay Bar aboard the 42-foot vessel Mary B II when it capsized into the stormy Pacific Ocean with reported waves of 14 to 16 feet with occasional waves of 20 feet. The hearing is scheduled to convene at the Newport City Hall at 8:00 a.m. May 13 and will continue to May 17, 2019. The address is 169 SW Coast Highway, Newport, OR 97365. A Coast Guard spokesperson will be available to meet with interested media at 7:00 a.m. Monday before the hearing begins. The hearing will also be streamed live each day at: https://livestream.com/accounts/17374493/events/8625145. The Coast Guard has established an e-mail address for the public and interested parties to provide information, ask questions and make comments related to the ongoing investigation and scheduled hearing. This e-mail will be checked regularly and all correspondence will be acknowledged. The e-mail is MaryBII.uscg@gmail.com. Throughout the investigation the Coast Guard will also continue to monitor any email that is sent to accidentinfo@uscg.mil and all information sent to that address will be reviewed and responded to.
JUNE – DECEMBER 2019 CLASS SCHEDULE

**STCW 5-DAY BASIC TRAINING (BT)**
$1,100 Members / $1,175 Non-Members  
Jun. 3-7, Jul. 8-12, Aug. 12-16, Sept. 9-13, Oct. 7-11, Nov. 11-15, Dec. 9-13

**STCW Basic Training Refresher**
$900 Members / $925 Non-Members  
Jun. 4/6/7, Jul. 8/10/11, Aug. 12/14/15, Sept. 10/12/13, Oct. 7/9/10, Nov. 11/13/14, Dec. 9/11/12

**STCW Basic Training Revalidation**
$765 Members / $795 Non-Members  

**Medical Emergencies at Sea**
$125 Members / $135 Non-Members  
Jun. 7, Jul. 8, Aug. 12, Sept. 13, Oct. 7, Nov. 11, Dec. 9

**2-Day Basic Fire Fighting**
$645 Members / $665 Non-Members  
Jun. 5-6, Jul. 9-10, Aug. 13-14, Sept. 11-12, Oct. 8-9, Nov. 12-13, Dec. 10-11

**Drill Instructor Workshop**
$175 Members / $200 Non-Members  
Jun. 5, Jul. 18, Aug. 8, Sept. 5, Oct. 21, Nov. 6, Dec. 4

**Shipyard Competent Person**
$575 Members / $595 Non-Members  

**Shipyard Competent Person Refresher**
$200 Members / $225 Non-Members  

**24-Hour HAZWOPER Technician**
$425 Members / $450 Non-Members  

**8-Hour HAZWOPER Refresher**
$200 Members / $225 Non-Members  
On first or last day of 24-Hour Class

**Specimen Collection Certification**
$150 Members / $175 Non-Members  

**STCW Medical Care Provider**
$1,300 Members / $1,400 Non-Members  
Dec. 3-6

Please call us to schedule the following classes:

**Safety Equipment & Survival Procedures**
$280 Members / $300 Non-Members

**8-Hour Shipboard Damage Control**
$300 Members / $315 Non-Members

**Stability**
$150 Members/$175 Non-Members

SAFETY BITES & MEMBER NEWS

NPFVOA Welcomes New Individual Member  
Patrick Gudmundson!

WHAT’S NEW?
NPFVOA understands how difficult it can be to have your crews take the training they need to keep certifications current. We are pleased to announce that we have an instructor who can either ride northbound or southbound on your vessel and hold First Aid/CPR, HAZWOPER Refresher, and Drill Instructor courses. They can also run drills with your crews or work with your fire teams. The potential training is endless! Call Rebecca to schedule.

A SPECIAL THANKS TO:  
American Seafoods and Marine Safety Services for the generous donation of Immersion Suits!

NPFVOA’S FALL GOLF TOURNAMENT FUNDRAISER
Tuesday, September 17, 2019  
Redmond Ridge Golf Club  
1pm Start Time

Day of fun with dinner to follow! If you haven’t attended our tournaments in the past and would like to this year, please email info@npfvoa.org to be added to our mailing list.

NPFVOA VESSEL SAFETY PROGRAM STAFF
KAREN CONRAD—EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR  
REBECCA HANRATTY—PROGRAM COORDINATOR  
KRYSTLE REITER—PROGRAM ASSISTANT

info@npfvoa.org  
www.npfvoa.org

For your convenience, current and past issues of our newsletter are available online at npfvoa.org.

This newsletter is published quarterly by the North Pacific Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association (NPFVOA) Vessel Safety Program and is free to members. To receive a subscription, please consider joining NPFVOA by completing the membership form on the back page and mailing it to NPFVOA with the appropriate fee. Memberships are annual, and all contributions are tax deductible. NPFVOA is a 501(c)(3) non-profit association.
NPFVOA Vessel Safety Program

Courses Include:

- STCW Basic Training
- STCW Basic Training Refresher
- STCW 2-Day Basic Firefighting
- STCW Medical Emergencies at Sea
- STCW Personal Survival Techniques
- STCW Personal Safety & Social Responsibility
- STCW Medical Care Provider
- STCW Basic Training Revalidation
- Drill Instructor Workshop
- 24-Hour HAZWOPER Technician
- 8-Hour HAZWOPER Refresher
- Specimen Collection Certification
- Shipyard Competent Person
- Shipyard Competent Person Refresher
- 8-Hour Shipboard Damage Control
- OSHA Marine 10-Hour
- OSHA Compliance at the Dock or Shipyard
- Onboard Drill Instructor Workshop
- In-the-Water Survival Training
- Pedestal Crane Operator Safety Training
- Navigation: Collision Avoidance
- Stability
- O/B Fire Team Training

Additional Custom Courses to fit all your safety training needs!
The NPFVOA Vessel Safety Program is a non-profit association dedicated to education and training in marine safety. Because safety is a concern for everyone in our industry, NPFVOA seeks membership from an expanded industry sector—commercial fishing, workboats, passenger and recreational vessels, and the businesses that support them.

Company Name: ____________________________
Primary Contact Name & Title: ____________________________
Address: ____________________________
City, State, Zip: ____________________________
Phone: ____________________________
Fax: ____________________________
Email: ____________________________
Web Site: ____________________________

Would you like to receive information & updates via email?  
Yes  
No

Would you like us to link to you from our web site?  
Yes  
No

Please describe the services your company provides: ___________________________________________________________________________________

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel Information</th>
<th>Vessel/Gear Type(s)</th>
<th>Target Fisheries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length (feet):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonnage (GRT):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Size:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- □ Vessel (over 79 ft.) $600  Benefits apply to all current crew members and management company.
- □ Vessel (60-79 ft.) $300  Benefits apply to all current crew members and management company.
- □ Vessel (under 60 ft.) $125  Benefits apply to all current crew members and management company.
- □ Associate $400  Benefits apply to business personnel only; vessel crew ineligible at this level.  (Appropriate for marine support industry, e.g., law firms, ship yards, fuel suppliers, etc.)
- □ Individual $75  Benefits are limited to named individual and are non-transferable  (Appropriate for crewmen and single-person business entities.)